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A few years ago, tax and accounting professionals raised eyebrows
over the perceived threat of the "tax patent."1 A veritable parade of
horribles were voiced, stoking fears to an Orwellian level amidst the
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1. Tax Patents:cert is filed in Bilski business method patent case, ATAXINGMATTER (Jan. 30,
2009),
http://ataxingmatter.blogs.com/tax/2009/0 l/tax-patents-cert-is-filed-in-bilski-businessmethod-patent-case.html; Evelyn McDowell, Tax Strategy Patents: Truth and Consequences Can
Patents EncourageInvention Without Complicating Tax Preparationand Compliance?, THE CPA J.
ONLINE (Feb. 2008), http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2008/208/essentials/p46.htm; Ellen P.
Aprill, Responding to Tax Strategy Patents, LOYOLA-LA LEGAL STUDIES PAPER NO. 2007-26
(April 2007); Dennis .Belcher & Dana G. Fitzsimons, Tax Planners-Bewareof PatentedEstate
Planning Techniques, PROB. & PROP. J. (Nov./Dec. 2006); Andrew A. Schwartz, Tax Strategies Are
Not PatentableInventions, 25 IPL NEWSLETTER 35 (Fall 2006).
2. These include claims that granting patent protection to tax strategies limited the use of the
patented approach for others simply trying to comply with the law; that tax preparers will be
burdened with due diligence searches just for trying to file tax returns; tax patents will violate rules
of ethical practice for attorneys, accountants, and tax planners; and that tax patents will set the stage
for patenting any efforts to comply with the law and in fact allow patents on legal practice. Others
in the patent field pointed out that the advent of tax patents might in fact benefit members of the tax
profession by leading to increased labor mobility and greater entrepreneurial opportunities. Dan L.
Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Patents, Tax Shelters, and the Firm, Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, No. 07-05, http://ssm.com/abstract=961749.
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seemed bent on wiping out the newfangled viral menace before it spread
too far. Now patent reform has attempted to accomplish that goal by
way of Section 14 of the Patent Reform Act of 2011, also commonly
referred to as the new American Invents Act. 3 Or has it? One may
question whether the new law effectively terminates tax patent efforts or
is merely a fagade perhaps only temporarily pacifying the concerns of
various constituencies who complained of problems that in practice were
never proven to exist.
This article briefly examines the short history of openly expressed
concerns regarding tax patents and the legislative response crafted to
address them. The goal here is not so much to argue in favor of tax
patents, although there is nothing wrong with them in terms of basic
legal principles, as it is to criticize the weak language of the bill, which
in attempting to satisfy so many, or perhaps based on the substantive
lack of understanding of the bill sponsors, led to the poor draftsmanship
of an unnecessary part of the new patent act.
I. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST TAX PATENTS
The arguments against tax patents were generally divided into three
broad categories. The public ownership category included hyperbolic
assertions loosely based on the notion that select groups of private
individuals would, by virtue of patent protection, be granted mercenary
ownership with respect to a body of law applicable to every single
person within the United States jurisdiction. As such, those private
individuals might "capture" the tax law-making process, reduce or
eliminate their own taxes without public benefit, and charge a toll for the
distribution of those same presumptively illegitimate tax reduction
benefits solely to other taxpayers able to afford that toll.
The due process/equal protection category included assertions that
the non-patent holder taxpayers, who could not afford the toll, would be
unable to comply with a law that is otherwise mandatory or be forced to
pay more government tribute than similarly situated taxpayers.
Additionally, the grant of the patent would result in a perceived

3. America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28 (2011).
4. See Linda M. Beale, Tax Patents:At the Crossroadof Tax and PatentLaw, 2008 U. ILL.
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 107 (2008) (arguing that tax patents should be prohibited); Charles F. Wieland,
III & E. Daniel Leightman, Patents on Tax Strategies: ProtectingInnovation or InhibitingAdvice?,
8 Hous. Bus. & TAX L. J. 225,249-64 (2008) (arguing against the need to prohibit tax patents).
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the resulting tax benefit that the government may
guarantee regarding
5
later disregard.
The insurmountable administrative burden category included
assertions that tax professionals would be precluded by patent law. from
rendering their best advice to those seeking to comply with the law and
that patent examiners might too easily grant patents for tax strategies as
a result of their lack of tax expertise (increasing the likelihood of the
former insurmountable administrative burden).
The latter point is
essentially an assertion that tax strategies for which patents are granted
would normally be novel only to the unschooled,
and thus not deserving
7
of patent protection in the first instance.
The last objection-that patent examiners lack qualifications to
determine the non-obviousness of tax patents-is answerable in two
different ways. As noted earlier, patents are granted for useful, novel,
and non-obvious inventions. Implicit in the assertion regarding the
ability of patent examiners to determine whether a tax strategy meets
these criteria is the notion that, if patent examiners were well-versed in
tax law, most tax strategies would fail the non-obviousness requirement
and not gain patent protection. 8 The basic examination standard

5. The due process/equal protection arguments are often stated in the tax language of
"horizontal equity":
A patented tax loophole may leave similarly situated taxpayers in three different
situations. The taxpayer who invents the tax loophole and obtains the patent will be able
to reduce her taxes without paying any license fees. All other taxpayers that could use
the loophole are faced with a choice that will have economic consequences. Some
taxpayers may choose to use the loophole and pay license fees to the patent holder to
avoid being sued for patent infringement. Other taxpayers will choose not to license the
loophole and, out of fear of being sued for patent infringement, will not use the loophole
and will pay higher taxes. Thus, similarly situated taxpayers will wind up in three
different economic situations as a result of patents on loopholes.
William A. Drennen, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to this Judicial
Invention, 59 FLA. TAX REv. 229,281 (2007).
6. Beale, supra note 4, at 143 (regarding the professional concerns raised by tax patents,
including the burdens that might require tax planners to limit the scope of the advice they provide to
clients).
7. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91
MINN L. REv. 101 (2006) (arguing that even invalid patents can result in serious anti-competitive
effects in the marketplace).
8. It is well documented that patent examiners are qualitatively and quantitatively
overwhelmed by their assigned tasks and, as a result, improvidently grant too many patents, but this
is not an assertion unique to the examination of tax strategies. The understaffing and insufficient
training within the patent office has been a known fact for years:
Here's how bad it is at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. If the agency could shut
its doors to catch up on its work, its 5,500 patent examiners would take at least two years
to clear the backlog of pending applications. When the agency reopened, there would be
more than 1 million new applications piled up on the doorstep. In the global economy,
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essentially requires that the invention involve a strategy a well-versed
tax professional would not easily recognize.9 A person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA) for determining obviousness of the claimed
invention is a reasonableness standard as opposed to a standard requiring
the level of knowledge possessed by the most knowledgeable expert in
any given field. 10 The obvious is illusive and perhaps even nonexistent,
however, to even the most well-versed tax professional."
innovation, technological progress and the protection of intellectual property rights are
keys to U.S. competitiveness. Keeping up with the demand for patents is critical to the
nation's health. But the patent office is suffering from troublesome turnover. One
patent examiner leaves for nearly every two the agency hires, according to a report from
the Government Accountability Office, an arm of Congress. About two-thirds of patent
examiners surveyed by the GAO said the patent office's production quotas are one of the
biggest reasons for quitting. To meet their quotas, 70 percent of examiners surveyed by
the GAO said they had to work substantial unpaid overtime in the previous 12 months.
Others said they caught up with their work while on vacation. The production quotas are
based on the number of applications that examiners must review and complete biweekly
and have not been adjusted since 1976. Since then, patent applications have become
more complex, which means it takes longer to review them.
Stephen Barr, Backlog, Quotas Overwhelm Patent Examiners, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Oct. 8,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynlcontent/article/2007/10/07/AR2007100701199.
html. See generally U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT
TO REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG, United States Government Accounting Office
(Sept. 2007), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07ll02.pdf. Another commentator notes, without
regard to tax patents in particular:
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or USPTO) has recently
come under increasing scrutiny for the quality of the examinations to which patent
applications are subjected. It has been argued that U.S. patent examination is deficient
as compared to other national patent offices. The common criticism from all sides is that
the Patent Office grants patent claims that are broader than what is merited by the
invention and the prior art, resulting in so-called "bad" or improvidently granted patents.
This problem is exacerbated with respect to new technologies such as Interne and
computer software, where it can be difficult to identify prior art information. The
existence of these types of errors has important economic consequences, including
inefficient resource allocation and significant harm to economic growth.
Jay P. Kesan & Andreas A. Gallo, Why Bad Patents Survive in the Market and How We Should
Change: The Privateand Social Costs ofPatents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61 (2006).
9. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). For a thorough discussion of the history and meaning of Mr.
Phosita, see Joseph P. Omeara, Just Who is The Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent
Law's Mysterious Personage,77 WASH. L. REV. 267 (2002).
10. "Patent law's 'person having ordinary skill in the art' (Phosita) has been likened to the
reasonable person of tort law." Id. at 267 (citing Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg., 810 F.2d 1561,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
11. One reason why tax reduction strategies are rarely obvious is that they typically make no
economic sense and, absent tax considerations, would be against common sense. One of the more
famous descriptions of a tax shelter, for example, is "a deal done by very smart people that, absent
tax considerations, would be very stupid." Tax Report, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al (quoting
Professor Michael Graetz). By contrast, another observer describes a tax shelter transaction as "a
deal done by very smart people who are pretending to be rather stupid themselves for financial
gain." David P. Hariton, Response to "Old 'Brine' in New Bottles "(New Brine in Old Bottles), 55
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One may confidently assert that a tax strategy for which a taxpayer
will pay a cost involves the application and interrelationship of and
between several disparate tax statutes, regulations, administrative
interpretations, and judicial opinions; rarely will that interrelationship be
accurately described as obvious, if only because tax professionals tend to
specialize in coherent, self-contained portions of the tax code. In short,
there is nothing that can be easily described as "obvious" with respect to
a tax strategy even for well-versed tax professionals whose expertise is
never as expansive as the entire tax code. Even if the patent office were
staffed with persons having years of professional tax training and
experience, it would not likely reject more tax patent applications than
under present circumstances.
Indeed, every "new" tax strategy invariably involves the discovery
of an otherwise unanticipated consequence of two or more legal tax
doctrines, oftentimes from disparate sections of the tax code.
On July 13, 2006, the House Committee on Ways and Means
received testimony before the Subcommittee on Select Revenue
Measures. 12
Those testifying included Dennis I. Belcher, an
experienced tax attorney who was also an officer in the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC). Mr. Belcher was
specifically concerned with the implications of a patent issued in 2003,
which had become commonly known as the SOGRAT patent. 13 The
SOGRAT patent involved the use of Stock Options to fund a Grantor
Retained Annuity Trust, hence the name. Grantor retained annuity trust
funding was a commonly used estate planning technique; thus, according
to Mr. Belcher's testimony, the estate planning community was shocked

TAx L. REV. 397, 398 (2002). The point relevant to the present discussion is that typically, complex
tax reduction strategies are hardly ever "obvious" in the PHOSITA sense, in large part because they
are counter-intuitive.
12. Issues Relating to the Patentingof Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/transcript/10219.html.
13. Id. (statement of Dennis I. Belcher, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP). The SOGRAT patent
was not the first tax patent issued but it did illustrate the breadth of the controversy. "Tax patent" is
really a broad misnomer that fails to do anything more than indicate that a patent issued may impact
the area of tax liability for some person or entity at some time in the future. It is akin to saying
someone has an electrical patent and, because everyone needs electricity, no one should be able to
get such a patent. Prior to SOGRAT, many patents affecting taxes in some fashion had issued and
some even included the disputed patent in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Finanicial
Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), as the first tax patent. See Method And Apparatus
That Processes Financial Data Relating To Wealth Accumulation Plans, U.S. Patent No. 5,991,744
(filed Oct. 31, 1997) (issued Nov. 23, 1999) and System For Performing Tax Computations, U. S.
Patent No. 6,064,983 (filed Mar. 21, 1997) (issued May 16, 2000).
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to learn that a patent of this type was issued. 14 Mr.Belcher testified that
the existence of the SOGRAT patent prevented taxpayers from using a
government authorized estate and gift 15tax reduction technique when
attempting to plan their financial affairs.
Mr. Belcher alluded to the high cost of defending
a patent
infringement lawsuit or alternatively instigating a suit to declare a patent
invalid. 16 Cost factors are a matter of significant consideration
throughout the legal system, and this is especially true regarding patent
litigation. 17 While some patent infringement suits have cost the parties
involved millions of dollars in litigation expenses and remedies, those
figures are atypical in relation to the average patent granted. Mr.
Belcher failed to mention the high costs of bringing an action for
infringement, something patent holders must constantly evaluate in
determining the de9see to which they are willing to police their
intellectual property.
Many individuals receive implicit satisfaction
from the government's recognition of their invention as evidenced by
their patent, and most
19 patented subject matter does not end up as part of

market transactions.

All patents raise the costs associated with the patented subject
matter because the patent holder obtains certain exclusive rights that
others must pay for in order to use the patented subject matter. These

14. Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Dennis I.
Belcher, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP).
15. Id. See also George G. Jones & Mark A. Luscombe, Patenting Tax Strategies: A
Troubling Storm Develops, ACCOUNTING TODAY (Aug. 21, 2006), http://www.webcpa.com/article.
cfn?articleid=21538.
16. Issues Relating to the Patentingof Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Dennis I.
Belcher, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP).
17. Michael K. Kirk, Executive Director of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association (AIPLA) testified in 2004, that AIPLS's annual economic survey indicated that
practitioners reported average costs of $500,000 to $3,995,000 in patent infringement suits.
Hearing on Issues Relating to Patent Quality Improvement. Post Grant Opposition Before the
Subcomm. On Courts, The Internet and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. On Ways and
Means, 108th Cong. (2004), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg94459/
html/CHRG-108hhrg94459.htm.
18. Id
19. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, ProbabalisticPatents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
75 (Spring 2005) (noting that while nearly 200,000 patents are issued by the USPTO annually, most
have little or no commercial value, and only 1.5% of patents are ever litigated to trial. Those facts
are juxtaposed against the fact that inventors file more than 350,000 patent applications a year with
the USPTO and spend over $5 billion a year on just the process of obtaining patents).
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) provides "whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
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costs are temporary and are offset to some degree by the fact that
21
patented subject matter must be disclosed to the general public.
Furthermore, the general public is usually unaware of the patent status of
the things they use on a daily basis. 22 Taxpayers usually seek to' secure
the best advice possible and are unlikely to be affected by the fact that a
tax saving method is touted as patented or not.23 Goods and services are
rarely if ever marketed based on their IP status.
Mr. Belcher and others' testimony insisted that the Internal,
Revenue Service ("IRS") or USPTO curtail the use of tax planning
patents or that Congress provide a solution by denying tax patents

patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent." These rights are
often characterized as the patent holder's monopoly, which has in turn given rise to debates over the
antitrust implications of a patent. A patent does not give one an absolute right to practice the
invention, and while the right to exclude others from selling, using, and making the patented res,
even that right has limitations. Thus, monopoly is used quite differently in patent law than in the
normal legal parlance in which one finds the term monopoly used such as in the area of antitrust
law. There, the term connotes a singular entity having a market advantage over all others that
disrupts the vital need for competition to the financial disadvantage of consumers. There is no such
corollary in the patent use of the term. See Aaron B. Rabinowitz, When does a PatentRight Become
an Antitrust Wrong? Antitrust Liabilityfor Refusals to Deal in Patented Goods, 11 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 7 (Winter 2005); Andrea Figler Ventura, Mourning the Consumer Demand Test: Restoring
the ProperAnalysis to Antitrust Monopoly Leveraging Claims Against PatentHolders, 36 Sw. U. L.
REv. 107 (2007).
21. When a patent is issued by the patent office, it is disclosed to the public. Before 1999, a
patent application was not disclosed before the patent issued; however, the law was changed in
1999, to require that patent applications generally be disclosed 18 months after filing. See
Publication of Patent Applications, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_
info conceming_patents.jsp#heading-13 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012); see also Donald R. Palladino,
The Publication Bar: How Disclosing an Invention to Others Can Jeopardize Potential Patent
Rights, 37 DUQ. L. REv. 353 (1999).
22. Patented subject matter or those hoping to secure a patent may indicate there is a patent by
labeling the subject matter with the words "Patented" or "U.S. Patent" followed by the patent
registration number or by the words "patent pending" or "patent applied for." Improper use of the
terms can subject the user to a fine for public deception. See Frequently Asked Questions About
Patents, USPTO. GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/faq.htm (last visited Oct.
24, 2011).
23. Not having a patent does not preclude one from financially benefitting from their
invention and securing a patent does not indicate there will be financial success. In fact, most
patented items do not make money. The American Invertors Protection Act was signed into law in
1999 (P.L. 106-113) in order to help inventors avoid the multi-million dollar scam network that is
rampant throughout the country where con artists prey on the hopes of inventors that their
inventions will be profitable. Many of these entities have been shut down in recent years by various
efforts of the Federal Trade Commission including their cleverly named "Project Mousetrap." See
FTC/State "Project Mousetrap" snares Invention Promotion Industry, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/mouse.shtm (last visited Oct. 24,2011).
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protection. 24 Similar options were presented by other groups such as the
National Conference of CPA Practitioners ("NCCPA") 25and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA").
The NCCPA identified a potential costly need for tax practitioners
to educate themselves about patent law in order to avoid problems such
as the prospect of providing advice that resulted in unintended
infringement. 6 These actions were deemed especially necessary
because patent law, unlike some other areas of IP law, makes no
exception for "innocent infringement". 27 The NCCPA also recognized
that patents are only as strong as the owner's ability to enforce them but
viewed tax patents as being susceptible to sell to well-financed "patent
mills''28 Those entities would supposedly seek nuisance value damages
or bogus royalties from thousands of tax practitioners. 29 That fear was
also unjustified from a tax patent standpoint. The total body of patent
law indicates this concern is also unrealistic. Nuisance damages and
improperly extorted royalty payments are in fact very rare in patent
30
law.

24. Issues Relating to the Patentingof Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Dennis I.
Belcher, Partner, McGuire Woods LLP).
25. Walter M. Primoff, Tax Strategies Patents, SUMNEWS, Summer 112007, at 10. Similar
options were presented by other groups such as the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA). Id.
26. Id.
27. Even in copyright law where "innocent infringement" is viable, it is not a defense to
infringement but instead a mitigating factor limiting the remedial exposure of a defendant when the
protected work failed to give notice of its protection. Failure to designate a patented product does
not give the infringer any such protection. But recent decisions have made it more difficult for a
plaintiff to prove that infringement is willful and thereby worthy of receiving an enhanced award.
See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
28. Primoff, supranote 25.
29. Id.
30. The closest thing to improperly extorted royalties in the patent field arises from patent
trolls, submarine patents and patent misuses based on alleged illegal tying arrangements from an
antitrust perspective. See Daniel J. McFeely, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights of
Those Who Misuse the US. PatentSystem to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289
(2008); see also Blair Silver, Controlling Patent Trolling with Civil RICO, II YALE J. L. & TECH.
70 (2009).
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II. TAX PRACTICE REALITIES
Detractors of tax patents (and often times supporters as well)
generally provided arguments that were almost3 1 entirely divorced from
contemporary or even historical actual practice.
That tax strategies abounded even before the contemporary debate
supports a conclusion that the existence of patent protection is neutral, at
best, with regard to positive or negative incentives. A couple of
contemporary and thoroughly discussed tax reduction strategies
The first involves the use of "blocker
highlight these facts.
corporations" by offshore investment funds to avoid the unrelated
business income tax.32 The second involves the "son of boss"
31. Most objections to tax patents are articulated in terms of a broad and vague set of
supposed dangers: 1. The fear that tax shelter patents might increase abusive activities; 2. The fear
that the patent office is not equipped to evaluate tax strategy patents; 3. The fear that owners of tax
strategy patents might misrepresent the patent as a government endorsement of the underlying
strategy; 4. The fear that owners of tax strategy patents could charge a fee for use of the patent; and
5. The fear that patents would provide incentives for innovation in a field where such incentives are
unnecessary.
Issuing these types of patents raises multiple public policy concerns. Patents issued for
aggressive tax strategies, for example, may enable unscrupulous promoters to claim the
patent represents an official endorsement of the strategy and evidence that it would
withstand IRS challenge. Patents could be issued for blatantly illegal tax shelters, yet
remain in place for years, producing revenue for the wrongdoers while the IRS battles
the promoters in court. Patents for tax shelters found to be illegal by a court would
nevertheless remain in place, creating confusion among users and possibly producing
illicit income for the patent holder.
Another set of policy concerns relates to the patenting of more routine tax strategies.
If a single tax practitioner is the first to discover an advantage granted by the law and
secures a patent for it, that person could then effectively charge a toll for all other
taxpayers to use the same strategy, even though as a matter of public policy all persons
ought to be able to take advantage of the law to minimize their taxes. Companies could
even patent a legal method to minimize their taxes and then refuse to license that patent
to their competitors in order to prevent them from lowering their operating costs. Tax
patents could be used to hinder productivity and competition rather than foster it.
The primary rationale for granting patents is to encourage innovation, which is
normally perceived to be a sufficient public benefit to justify granting a temporary
monopoly to the patent holder. In the tax arena, however, there has historically been
ample incentive for innovation in the form of the tax savings alone. The last thing we
need is a further incentive for aggressive tax shelters. That's why Section 303 would
prohibit the patenting of any "invention designed to minimize, avoid, defer, or otherwise
affect the liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax."
153 Cong. Rec. S2206-07 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2007) (statement of Senator Carl Levin, Introducing
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 68 1, 110th Cong.).
32. The origin and uses of the "blocker corporation" invention were developed by pension
funds and other nonprofit organizations to avoid the unrelated business income tax. See Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 199952086 (Sept. 30, 1999) (describing and approving of the use of an offshore corporation--a
blocker corporation-to avoid the unrelated debt financed income tax imposed by I.R.C. § 514).
The blocker corporation was actually a target of later tax revision efforts aimed at offsetting the
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strategy-generically described as the use of a partnership to
manufacture a tax loss deduction without any real economic loss.33 One
may have also included 'joint operating agreements" 3 4 and the
partnership profit interest strategy transactions to further emphasize
the point, but it is sufficiently proven by the first two strategies, both of
which result in fewer taxes paid by the beneficiaries or, in intellectual
property terms, "owners" of the strategies. Both of these strategies were
motivated by the desire to avoid taxes, yet they demonstrate opposite
responses. Blocker corporations are deemed as advantageous to tax law,
while the son of boss strategy is considered harmful to tax law. Both
could have been protected by tax patents, yet the taxpayer, industry, and
government responses to each would not have been affected. These
examples highlight the necessity of evaluating tax strategies on a caseby-case basis. A rule categorically denying tax patents precludes

savings resulting from the scheme. These efforts as part of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act
needlessly incorporated provisions seeking to ban tax patents. See infra note 69 and accompanying
text. See also Samuel D. Brunson, Stopping Tax Haven Abuse Without Stopping Tax-Exempt
Investment, available at
http://www.jrcls.org/facultyconference/201 1/Investment%2Oand%20the%20unrelated%20debtfinanced%20income%20rules.pdf (noting that the legislation "would make investment through
offshore hedge funds and other offshore blocker corporations impractical for tax-exempt
organizations, while not providing for any equivalent investment option.").
33. The "Son of Boss" strategy, formerly used by taxpayers to generate tax loss deductions
without a corresponding economic loss, has since been shut down by administrative and legislative
action. See IRS Notice 2000-44 (Aug. 11, 2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsutl/notice 2000-44.pdf (stating the IRS' intent to vigorously challenge the strategy); Treas. Reg.
1.752-7
(2005),
available
at
http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/partnerships/article/0,,id=
134691,00.html (regarding the definition of "liabilities" in a manner that prevents the effectuation of
the Son of Boss tax strategy).
34. See Darryll K. Jones, Creating Complex Monsters: Joint OperatingAgreements and The
Logical Invalidity of Treasury Regulation 1.502-1(b), 3 FLA. TAX REv. 563 (1997) (describing the
"joint operating agreement" invention as a tool to avoid the unrelated business income taxalthough the strategy allowed users to avoid a tax that seemed to otherwise apply to the joint efforts
embodied in joint operating agreements, the Service nevertheless approved the invention's
effectiveness. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-22-042 (Mar. 3, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-21-031 (Feb. 26,
1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-16-021 (Jan. 17, 1997); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-14-011 (Dec. 24, 1996); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 96-51-047 (Sept. 24, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-23-011 (Feb. 29, 1996); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9609-011 (Nov. 22, 1995).
35. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing PartnershipProfits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2008) (describing the use of partnership profit interests to achieve
deferral of income and reduction in tax rates applicable to compensation income). The partnership
profit interest strategy was initially approved by the Service when it appeared the deleterious effects
on tax revenues were considered insignificant. Later, when the effects were thought to be more
damaging to the fairness and integrity of the tax code, legislators initiated actions to deprive the
strategy of its effectiveness. See generally Darryll K. Jones, The Taxation of Profits Interests and
The Reverse Mancur Olson Phenomenon, 36 CAP. L. REv. 853 (2009).
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individual consideration and thus good as well as bad advancements in
36
the law.
Taxes are mandatory, but the transactions that generate tax liability
are not. The tax code is replete with provisions that encourage but do
not demand certain transactions and then give certain tax benefits only to
those who are successfully encouraged to act. The grant of patent
protection would not prevent compliance with a transaction giving rise
to tax liability because compliance is never demanded. The due process
assertion-that the law punishes noncompliance when the government's
grant of a patent prevents compliance-just does not prove true. In
other words, horizontal inequities in tax law or administration are hardly
the result of granting patents for tax strategies. That some similarly
situated taxpayers pay disparate amounts of taxes is the result of
capitalism.
The developers of a patentable tax strategy might make their
invention available solely to those able and willing to pay a fee and, as a
result, similarly situated taxpayers may face dissimilar tax burdens.
Even in the absence of patent protection, though, only those who could
afford rather expensive tax advisors would have access to the strategy.
Regardless of whether patent protection existed, the strategy would be
available solely to those who could afford to navigate the volume and
complexity of the tax code. 3 7 This is simply the reflection of the
business of law, not a result of patent protection or the lack thereof.
The strategies discussed above are done so in only enough detail to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the strategies for tax reduction purposes
and allow one to intuitively make the following conclusions:
First, tax patents will not add appreciably to existing incentives to
reduce or avoid taxes. The search for tax reduction strategies is, instead,
positively correlated with the amount of taxes to be saved and the
economic profit from the activity pursued.
Second, even if tax patents add to the body of knowledge devoted
exclusively to illegitimate tax avoidance that is not necessarily a bad
thing. In most instances viewed as abusive, Congress, the IRS, or the
36. Many tax provisions are enacted to encourage or discourage government endorsed
consumption or spending and to that extent are entirely optional; indeed, the tax code never
demands the undertaking of any given economic transaction. For example, tax benefits for the
purchase of electric powered vehicles are designed to encourage favored consumption but there is
no mandate involved. See I.R.C. § 179A (2006) (providing for a deduction equal to the costs of
"clean fuel burning vehicles").
37. The blocker corporation solution, like many tax strategies, requires the services of experts
trained in the intricate provisions that both make the invention necessary and ensure its
effectiveness.
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judiciary can and has easily, albeit sometimes belatedly, responded .in a
fashion that ultimately improved the articulation, efficiency, and fairness
of the tax code.
Third, even assuming there really is already too much incentive for
tax planning, tax patents can nevertheless only increase social utility.
The assumption that encouraging inventive minds increases social utility
regardless of subject and even if "bad inventions" sometimes result, is
no less applicable to the application of inventive minds to the goal of tax
reduction. Taxes are, like any other cost, expenses that reduce gross
national product-by reducing the businessperson's desire or ability, for
example, to hire more workers or invest in more physical plants. To the
extent tax patents reduce disincentives to business activity-by
removing unintended tax barriers, social utility increases-and the need
for government extractions decrease.
A final conclusion, necessarily implicit in each of the foregoing
conclusions, is that it is incorrect to treat tax reduction strategies,
whether subject to patent protection or not, as synonymous with
illegitimate tax avoidance. Much of the tax literature does just that.
III. RECENT JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INFLUENCES
While the SOGRAT patent may have been responsible for the tax
patent debate reaching congressional heights, the genesis of the dispute
appears tied to the CAFC decision in State Street Bank.38 Despite the
USPTO's assertions that protection of business method patents date back
to the late 18th century, there was little debate about the propriety of
these types of patents until State Street Bank.39 In fact, cases had

38. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In that
case, the patent at issue involved a data processing system for financial services. The court found
that a machine's transformation of data representing dollar amounts into share prices via
mathematical transactions was patentable. The CAFC expressly stated that business methods were
not unpatentable subject matter but instead were subject to the same evaluation as other types of
subject matter. The more important question was not whether a business method was involved but
instead whether a useful, concrete, and tangible result was reached through the method or process
sought to be patented. Some assert that inspiration for the new provision predates State Street Bank
instead growing out of a bill in the 104th Congress seeking to bar patentability medical procedure
methods. See Hayden W. Gregory, Patents on Tax PreparationStrategies:Is the End in Sight?, 3
LANDSLIDE 1, March/April 2011. Congress ultimately approved medical procedure patents but
eliminated enforcement remedies against infringing medical practitioners or facilities. See Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 616 (Sept. 30, 1996).
39. According to the USPTO, business method patents date back to the late eighteenth (18th)
century shortly after the Constitutional Convention. The first financial patent was granted on March
19, 1799, to Jacob Perkins for an invention for "Detecting Counterfeit Notes." USPTO White Paper
- Automated Business Methods - Section III Class 705, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/
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expressly held that business methods were unpatentable long before
software and the Internet were ever conceived of.40 State Street Bank
expressly rejected the so-called business methods exception in patent
law and the case is routinely referred to
as opening the floodgates for
41
business method patents on the Internet.
In 2006, the SOGRAT patent holders filed suit against Aetna
alleging infringement.42 The alleged infringing activity was discovered
during the review of the SEC filings generally required when trusts are
funded with security instruments. That4 3suit was settled although the
terms of the agreement were not released.
Although the reasons for the ultimate settlement are unknown,
many tax experts had ridiculed the existence of the patent; therefore, the
plaintiff may have been as motivated to settle as the defendant for fear of
the patent's inability to withstand a validity challenge. 4 4 If the patent
was strong, the plaintiff would certainly want everyone to know of the
damages it was able to secure. Perhaps the defendant did not want to

methodsafmdpm/class705.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). See also John M. Carson & Eric M.
Nelson, Legal Victory for Electronic Commerce Companies: State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature
Financial Group Signals Fall of Last Barrier to Internet Software Patents, 21 T. JEFFERSON. L.
REV. 193 (1999) (noting that State Street Bank was seen as a government affirmation that not only
were software patents easily available for protection based on the standards enunciated in that case
but also that internet patents were also easily achievable).
40. See, e.g., Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). There,
the court held that a bookkeeping system to prevent embezzlement by waiters was unpatentable.
After the arrival of software and computers the courts were still reluctant to consider the instructions
and operability associated with technology as patentable subject matter since in its rawest form it
was really numbers at the arrangement of numbers at the core of the disputes. The Court had
generally construed mathematical algorithms as abstract ideas, and thus as unpatentable subject
matter under § 101 of the patent act. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981), the Court relaxed this
algorithm unpatentability doctrine by concluding that the incorporation of a computer algorithm to
improve an industrial process did not automatically make the process unpatentable subject matter.
The Court did not overrule the Benson-Flook algorithm unpatentability doctrine but nevertheless
stated, "an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process
may well be deserving of patent protection." Id. at 187.
41. Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or business as Usual?,
2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 347, 348 (Fall 2001) (noting that as a result of State Street Bank
and its progeny that by 2001 more than 40,000 business method patents had been issued with
thousands more in line leading to ineffective patent searches and bad patents due to the USPTO
being ill equipped to handle those types of applications).
42. GREGORY A. STOBBS, BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 13-14 (Aspen Pub. 2002).
43. CAROL CANTRELL, STOCK OPTIONS: ESTATE, TAX AND FINANCIAL PLANNING 6-36-6-37
(CCH 2008).
44. Although few patents are litigated, a high number of those challenges are successful. See
Lemley, supra note 19, at 76 (noting that roughly half of all litigated patents are found to be
invalid).
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45
challenge the patent, deciding it was cheaper to settle than litigate.
None of these scenarios are particular to tax patents, inasmuch as they
are normal business decisions that must be made regularly due to the
intersection of IP law with nearly all commercial concerns.
The Supreme Court of the United States' ("SCOTUS") decision in
KSR InternationalCo. v. Teleflex Inc. significantly reduced the potential
for patent protection by making it easier to find patent claims obvious
under the law.46 The District Court granted KSR summary judgment,
but the CAFC reversed based on the lower court's failure to properl
apply the applicable "teaching, suggestion, motivation" test ("TSM").
The SCOTUS reversed, finding that the CAFC approach to obviousness
was too narrow and rigid and4 8therefore inconsistent with the dictates of
Section 103 of the Patent Act.
While the KSR decision indicated that patents generally would be
both harder to obtain and sustain, the SCOTUS sent a very different
message with its decision in In re Bilski.49 On April 10, 1997, Bernard
L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw ("Bilski") filed a patent application
entitled "Energy Risk Management Method." 50 The parties claimed to
have invented a method or process for managing the consumption risk
costs involved in certain commodity transactions. 5 1 The examiner
rejected the application under Section 101 of the Patent Act, finding that

45. The owner of the SOGRAT patent had issued at least one license regarding its patent. See
Cantrell, supra note 42.
46. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). Also in 2007, the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), the principle court for reviewing patent disputes, issued a
significant ruling in In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). There, the court found that
certain types of business systems were unpatentable. Specifically, the claimants application to
patent an arbitration method related to certain legal documents was deemed to be a set of mental
processes that were abstract ideas and thus unpatentable despite the fact that certain claims
expressly required the use of a computer or other means of electronic communication to accomplish
the claimed tasks. The court held that processes involving human thinking standing alone were not
patentable regardless of the practical application. The original decision in Comiskey was later
revised in 2009 in an apparent effort to clarify the earlier opinion's efforts to define the line of
patentable subject matter where business methods and machines intersected. See Federal Circuit
Revises (Muzzles) Comiskey, PATENTLYO (Jan. 13, 2009), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/
01/federal-circu-3.html.
47. KSR, 550 U.S. at412-13.
48. Id.at 415. ("We begin by rejecting the rigid approach of the Court of Appeals.
Throughout this Court's engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have set forth an
expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM
test here.").
49. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
50. ExParteBilski & Warsaw, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006).
51. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3232.
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the claims were directed to nonstatutory subject matter. The applicants
appealed and the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
("BPAI") affirmed the rejection of all the claims. 53 The applicants
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which took the
unusual step of determining that an en banc panel was necessary to
render a proper decision.
The CAFC heard oral arguments and
received approximately thirty (30) amicus briefs from interested parties
on the general issue of defining patentable subject matter as applied to
methods or processes. 55 The CAFC affirmed the decision of the BPAI
patent-eligible
concluding that Bilski's claims were not directed to
56 Bilski then appealed to the SCOTUS. 57
matter.
subject
The SCOTUS unanimously rejected the patent application agreeing
that the machine or transformation test was not the sole basis or even
necessary for determining if a process described patentable subject
matter.
However, the Court rejected the idea that business methods
should be categorically excluded. 59 Four of the Justices took the
contrary view, arguing that the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and established precedent
the removal of business methods
• supported
60
The majority stated that modem
from patentable subject matter.
technologies posed a challenge for patent law to find the optimum
balance between protecting inventors and avoiding inappropriate

52. Id. at 3233.
53. Id. at 3220.
54. Id.
55. For an excellent summary of the main points on each brief, see Ex ParteBilski: On the
Briefs:, PATENTLYO (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/04/ex-parte-bilski.
html. The briefs and arguments could basically be categorized as those disfavoring a rigid
interpretation of Section 101 as opposed to those favoring the recognition of Section 101 as a
threshold and setting forth some type of test language to that end. Amongst the amicus filers was
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA"), whose brief specifically argued
against the validity of tax patents.
56. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The B.P.A.I. decision thoroughly reviewed
the judicial precedent interpreting Section 101 in its effort to answer the question of what test(s)
should be applied in determining statutory subject matter. The BPAI decision noted that the claims
in question were so broad that they amounted to an abstract idea ineligible for patent protection.
The BPAI noted that the claims failed to involve patent-eligible transformation and that the process
as claimed failed to produce the requisite "useful, concrete and tangible result".
57. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3221.
60. Id. at 3232 (Justice Stevens concurring in the Court's holding, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor, but stating that "although a process is not patent-ineligible simply
because it is useful for conducting business, a claim that merely describes a method of doing
business does not qualify as a "process" under §101 of the Patent Act").
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monopolies but that "Nothing in this opinion should be read to take a
position on where that balance should be struck."6 '
Several recent decisions have wrestled with the implications of
Bilski as far as the SCOTUS' unwillingness or inability to provide a test
62
for determining when a business method patent is patentable or not. In
Ultramercialv. Hulu, the CAFC found that a patent covering a method
and system for payment of intellectual property royalties was not too
63
abstract to- be considered patentable subject matter.
In Classen
64
Immunotherapies v. Biogen IDEC, the CAFC determined that methods
for evaluating and improving safety immunization schedules were also
acceptable subject matter for a patent application; however, the
SCOTUS vacated the judgment and remanded for further consideration
in light of Bilski.6 5 Yet in Cybersource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
the court found an application for a patent comparing data such as IP
information and email addresses to detect fraud in credit card
transactions did not contain patentable subject matter but instead was too
abstract although, as inS•the 66
other cases, computers played some role in
inventions.
the
of
claims
the
These cases reflect the current whimsical state of the law in regards
to business methods and the systems they seek to cover regardless of
whether a computer or other machinery is employed. The degree of
uncertainty cuts across all commercial boundaries when it comes to
patents in the financial realm. The situation makes it even more ironic
that tax patents, a minor subsection of the patentable subject matter
section identified by the USPTO as Class 705, "Data Processing:
Financial, Business Practice, Management, or Cost/Price
Determination"
67
should be singled out for special negative treatment.

61. Id.at 3228.
62. See Julie Samuels, A Trio of Post-Bilski Cases Fail to Clearly Define the Meaning of
"Abstract", ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/09/triopost-bilski-cases-fail-clearly-define.
63. Id.
64. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304 Fed. App'x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. granted,judgment vacated, Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130 S.Ct. 3541
(2010).
65. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen DEC, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
66. CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
67. See, for example, an exemplary list of patents and pending applications in Class 705/36T,
US Patent Classification 705/36T, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/numeric/
class705sub36t.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
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It appears that as a result of Congressional hearings in 200468 on
bridging the tax gap, at which the Commissioner of Patents testified, and
follow up hearings in 2006, 69 that tax patents suddenly were designated
as some type of dangerous threat to be gotten rid of by any legislative
means necessary. The targeting of tax patents occurred despite the fact
that a very small number had ever been issued and of those many had
been in existence for years. 70 Perhaps it was the effort of a few of the
patent holders to enforce their patents that aroused more suspicion than
respect, but regardless of the impetus, tax patents were lumped in with
the evils of off shore tax havens and their impending doom, at least on
their face, was set in motion.
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act ("STHAA") was introduced in
2007, following an investigation into alleged abusive offshore tax
shelters that purportedly cost the U.S. Treasury an average of forty to

68. See Bridging the Tax Gap Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 10 (2004)
(statement of Nick Godici, Commissioner of Patents).
The Commissioner's testimony broadly addressed business method patents as potential
contributors to the country's tax gap but avoided singling out tax patents as a particularly dangerous
subclass and simply pledged that the Patent Office would monitor the situation as far as the
concerns raised by the other speakers that day. The other witnesses providing testimony were
primarily members of the tax community.
69. Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. On Select Revenue
Measures of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/transcript/10219.html.
70. For example, Patent No. 6,058,376, Process for Evaluating the Financial Consequences of
Converting a Standard Form I.R.A. to a Roth Form I.R.A., issued May 2, 2000, available at
http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sectl =PTO] &Sect2=HITOFF&d=PALL&p = I&u=/2F
netahtml%2FPTO%2Fsrchnum.htm&r 1l&f=G&l=50&s 1=6058376.PN.&OS=PN/6058376&RS=P
N/6058376, cites as references several other finance related patents dating back to 1987. The
invention claims a computer-implemented process for evaluating the financial consequences of
converting a standard format IRA to a new Roth form IRA. The process includes computing and
disclosing the substantial federal income tax consequences involved in converting the standard form
IRA to the Roth form. It further includes multiple options how a given IRA holder can cope with
the substantial tax consequences, including without limitation how he or she will fare if he or she
obtains term insurance on the federal tax liability of early withdrawal by reason of premature death,
or if he or she deducts the federal taxes and insurance premium from the rollover amount, or, in the
alternative, how he or she will fare by financing the federal tax consequences and insurance
premium in order to preserve intact the entire IRA amount for rollover. See also Michael Bowman,
U.S. Patent Reform in 2011-Implicationsfor the Insurance & FinancialIndustries, CORONADO
GROUP, LTD., http://www.coronadogroup.com/images/PatentReform_2011_BusinessMethods.
pdf (noting that as of March 11,2011, the USPTO had issued 136 tax strategy patents and published
161 patent [class 705] applications and that of the 136 patents issued only 32 indicate that a tax
strategy is their most comprehensive claim. Of the 32, half deal chiefly with software. Also, 16 of
the 136 are considered by the USPTO to be mainly insurance patents).
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seventy billion dollars annually from individual tax evasion. 71 The
Senate version of the legislation was sponsored by Senators Norm
Coleman and Carl Levin in addition to then Senator and now President
Barack Obama. 72 The primary aim of the legislation was to combat the
secrecy and increase the transparency of transactions that involved
offshore financial operations. 73 One of the many provisions for the
proposed legislation was formerly titled "Prohibition on Tax Shelter
Patents" and later 'Tax Planning Inventions Not Patentable." 74 The
Section proposed to amend § 101 of the Patent Act by adding provisions
75
dealing specifically with the unpatentability of tax planning devices.
71. See infra notes 79, 83 and accompanying text. See also Maria Tihin, The Trouble with
Tax Havens. The Needfor New Legislation in Combatingthe Use of Offshore Trusts in Abusive Tax
Shelters, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417 (2008).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74.
Issuing these types of patents raises multiple public policy concerns. Patents issued for
aggressive tax strategies, for example, may enable unscrupulous promoters to claim the
patent represents an official endorsement of the strategy and evidence that it would
withstand IRS challenge. Patents could be issued for blatantly illegal tax shelters, yet
remain in place for years, producing revenue for the wrongdoers while the IRS battles
the promoters in court. Patents for tax shelters found to be illegal by a court would
nevertheless remain in place, creating confusion among users and possibly producing
illicit income for the patent holder. Another set of policy concerns relates to the
patenting of more routine tax strategies. If a single tax practitioner is the first to discover
an advantage granted by the law and secures a patent for it, that person could then
effectively charge a toll for all other taxpayers to use the same strategy, even though as a
matter of public policy all persons ought to be able to take advantage of the law to
minimize their taxes. Companies could even patent a legal method to minimize their
taxes and then refuse to license that patent to their competitors in order to prevent them
from lowering their operating costs. Tax patents could be used to hinder productivity
and competition rather than foster it. The primary rationale for granting patents is to
encourage innovation, which is normally perceived to be a sufficient public benefit to
justify granting a temporary monopoly to the patent holder. In the tax arena, however,
there has historically been ample incentive for innovation in the form of the tax savings
alone. The last thing we need is a further incentive for aggressive tax shelters. That's
why Section 303 would prohibit the patenting of any "invention designed to minimize,
avoid, defer, or otherwise affect the liability for Federal, State, local, or foreign tax."
153 Cong. Rec. S2206-07 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2007) (statement of Senator Carl Levin, Introducing
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong.).
75. SEC. 303. TAX PLANNING INVENTIONS NOT PATENTABLE.
(a) In General- Section 101 of title 35, United States Code, is amended
(1) by striking 'Whoever' and inserting '(a) Patentable Inventions- Whoever', and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
*(b) Tax Planning Inventions'(1) UNPATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER- A patent may not be obtained for a
tax planning invention.
'(2) DEFINITIONS- For purposes of paragraph (I)-'(A) the term 'tax planning invention' means a plan, strategy, technique,
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Senator Levin's comments regarding the section indicated that it
was not addressed solely to offshore tax shelters but instead was a part
effort to prohibit all patents that involved tax saving
of the wide-ranging
76
processes.
It is possible that intense lobbying caused the Senator and
others to cast such a wide net, but tax patents were certainly not the
focus of the bill. 77 Indeed, commentary on the Act by various
organizations neglected to mention the section dealing with the
unpatentability of tax planning inventions altogether. 78 The original
STHAA failed to pass as have other versions since that time and while a

scheme, process, or system that is designed to reduce, minimize, determine, avoid, or
defer, or has, when implemented, the effect of reducing, minimizing, determining,
avoiding, or deferring, a taxpayer's tax liability or is designed to facilitate compliance
with tax laws, but does not include tax preparation software and other tools or systems
used solely to prepare tax or information returns,
"(B) the term 'taxpayer' means an individual, entity, or other person (as
defined in section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986),
'(C) the tems 'tax', 'tax laws', 'tax liability, and 'taxation' refer to any
Federal, State, county, city, municipality, foreign, or other governmental levy,
assessment, or imposition, whether measured by income, value, or otherwise, and
'(D) the term 'State' means each of the several States, the District of
Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.'.
(b) Applicability- The amendments made by this section(1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
(2) shall apply to any application for patent or application for a reissue patent that is(A) filed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act, or
(B) filed before that date if a patent or reissue patent has not been issued
pursuant to the application as of that date, and
(3) shall not be construed as validating any patent issued before the date of the
enactment of this Act for an invention described in section 101(b) of title 35, United
States Code, as added by this section.
S.506, 11 1th Cong. § 303 (2009).
76. Senator Levin specifically mentioned that it was necessary that all such patents be banned
in order to address a wide range of policy concerns. 153 Cong. Rec. S2206-07 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
2007) (statement of Senator Carl Levin, Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th
Cong.). These concerns put many in the mindset of the chicken and egg conundrum since the most
prominent points made mimicked much of the testimony presented during the hearings surrounding
the SOGRAT patent. Id. Specifically, Senator Levin noted (improperly) that patents could be
issued for "blatantly illegal tax shelters" and that even if patent shelters were found to be illegal by a
court they would remain in place under patent law continuing to wrongfully benefit those unaware
of the court decision. Id.
77. See, e.g., Tax Strategy Patents. Looking Back, CPA CAFE (Sept. 16, 2011),
http://cpacafe.blogspot.com/2011/09/tax-strategy-patents-looking-back.html (wherein the Virginia
CPA Association heralds Section 14 of the AIA eliminating tax patents as the triumph of five years
of legislative activity) (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
78. See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice, The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, Bill Targets Tax
Havens and Tax Dodging, CTJ CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE (July 25, 2011),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/stopact.pdf (where despite a summarization of the bill and an extraction of
bill highlights, no mention is made of Section 303 of the proposed legislation).
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version of the bill is still pending Section 303 of
the bill making tax
79
patent strategies unpatentable has been eliminated.
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 ("AIA") became
law on September 16, 2011.80
The law, touted as the most
comprehensive overhaul to the nation's patent system since the 19th
century, has many significant sections that change much of the way
patent law is practiced in this country. 8 Amongst the many provisions
in the Act is Section 14, which
deals with tax strategies in light of
2
obviousness and the prior art.8
Section 14 of the AIA is generally construed as eliminating the
prospect of patents being issued for tax strategies.83 It was drafted to
prevent alleged profiteering by innovative tax dodgers and declares

79. A version of the STHAA was still in session as of the summer of 2011, however, the latest
version has deleted the original Section 303. See H.R. 2669, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h 112-2669. See also Edward Tanenbaum, The
Annual Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act Show, BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.bna.com/annual-stop-tax-n12884903413/. Tax Strategy Patent Legislation in Prior
Congressional Sessions, AICPA (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/tax/resources/
taxpatents/pages/legislationinpriorcongresses.aspx.
80. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); see
also President Obama Signs America Invents Act, Overhauling the Patent System to Stimulate
Economic Growth, andAnnounces New Steps to Help Entrepreneurs Create Jobs, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS SEC'Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/201 1/09/16/president-obama-signs-america-invents-act-overhauling-patent-system-stim).
81. Id. See also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Implementation, USPTO.Gov,
http://www.uspto.gov/aia implementation/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
82. Specifically Section 14:
SEC. 14. TAX STRATEGIES DEEMED WITHIN THE PRIOR ART.
(a) IN GENERAL-For purposes of evaluating an invention under section 102 or 103 of title 35,
United States Code, any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, whether known or
unknown at the time of the invention or application for patent, shall be deemed insufficient to
differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art.
(b) DEFINITION.-For purposes of this section, the term "tax liability" refers to any liability for a
tax under any Federal, State, or local law, or the law of any foreign jurisdiction, including any
statute, rule, regulation, or ordinance that levies, imposes, or assesses such tax liability.
(c) EXCLUSIONS.-This section does not apply to that part of an invention that(1) is a method, apparatus, technology, computer program product, or system, that is used solely for
preparing a tax or information return or other tax filing, including one that records, transmits,
transfers, or organizes data related to such filing; or
(2) is a method, apparatus, technology, computer program product, or system used solely for
financial management, to the extent that it is severable from any tax strategy or does not limit the
use of any tax strategy by any taxpayer or tax advisor.
(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this section shall be construed to imply that other
business methods are patentable or that other business method patents are valid.
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.-This section shall take effect on the date of the
enactment of this Act and shall apply to any patent application that is pending on, or filed on or
after, that date, and to any patent that is issued on or after that date.
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, sec. 14, 125 Stat. 284, 327-28 (2011).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol6/iss2/4

20

Wilson: No Method to the Madness

2012]

No METHOD TO THE MADNESS

357

certain types of tax strategies to now be part of the prior art.84 .The
section appears to be a facially weak response that addresses a
questionable past "problem" while deflecting attention from the much
bigger issue of85business methods patents of which tax strategies are a
minor subpart.
Although much of the concern voiced before the section -was
finalized centered on individuals, the real culprit underlying much of the
debate was the potential for corporate tax abuse. Section 14 is a softer
version of comparable sections (Section 303) of the STHAA. Instead of
addressing Section 101 patentable subject matter, Section 14 speaks to
the evaluation of tax patents in light of the novelty and obviousness
provisions of Sections 102 and 103 of the Patent Act. 86 Thus, taking a
cue from the SCOTUS, patents related to taxes may be Section 101
patentable subject matter because Bilski failed to delineate any
boundaries for the same as related to business methods. Instead, because
Teleflex made it more difficult for claims eligible subject matter in light
of a broader approach to obviousness, Section 14 unceremoniously
makes tax strategy subject matter obvious. There is a caveat, however,
if the tax strategy subject matter is linked in a proper way to computers,
but unfortunately no guidance on just what type of software interactivity
Thus, one is presently only able to let "Turbo Tax" be the
is necessary.
87
guide.
Section 14 does not apply to patents covering preparation of tax
returns or financial management systems nor does it apply to methods or
apparatus involving computers that assist in achieving either of those
functions. 88 It also expressly states that it shall not be construed as
passing on the validity of business method patents in general. 89 Some
84. Id.
85. Section 14 also implies that a weakness existed in the functioning of the first inventor
defense. The First Inventor Defense Act of 1999 provided that one who independently reduced the
patented method to practice and then commercially used that method at least one year prior to
effective filing date of the patented method had a defense for conduct that would otherwise be
deemed infringement. The relatively new defense was established in direct response to
confirmation of business methods as patentable subject matter in the State Street Bank case. See
First Inventor Defense Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999), codified at 35 U.S.C. §
273(b).
86. Sec. 14, 125 Stat. at 327-28.
87. See U.S. Patent No. 6,697,787 (filed Feb. 6, 2001), System For Collecting Tax Data
(describing the invention as "an electronic intermediary electronically connects with a tax data
provider and collects electronically tax data from the tax data provider. The electronic intermediary
processes the tax data collected electronically, and prepares an electronic tax return using the
processed tax data.").
88. Sec. 14(c), 125 Stat. at 327-28.
89. Sec. 14(d), 125 Stat. at 328.
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have already attacked the language as being too broad or too narrow to
achieve its purported goal. Too narrow because patentability may
possibly still be achieved by a combination of the strategy with a device
or software that achieves the desired outcome in some new manner.
And too broad because the statute may be read to encompass business
methods or technical inventions that may act to reduce tax liability
although that is an unintended consequence of their actual purpose.90
The legislative history of the bill recounted many of the early
concerns from past
congressional hearings, proposed legislation, and
91
alarmists.
general
The legislation probably will forever retard if not effectively kill
the seedlings of what was being foreseen as a prospective cottage
industry. While relatively few tax strategy patents had issued over the
years there was an undeniable recent spike, which did portend of good
tidings for the finances of patent lawyers who would be employed to
92
draft, examine, prosecute, license, and litigate tax strategy matters.
Contrarily, some tax practitioners saw the potential growth as undesired
costs tied in to education, investigation, and unwarranted adjudication
over the myriad of concerns that threatened to further ensnare the
already complex area of tax planning.

90. See Mark A. Lemley, Things You Should Care About in the New Patent Statute, Stanford
Public Law Working Paper No. 1929044, Sept. 16, 2011.
91. H.R. REP.NO. 112-098, pt. 1,at 51-52 (2011).
Tax preparers, lawyers, and planners have a long history of sharing their knowledge
regarding how to file returns, plan estates, and advise clients. The ability to interpret the
tax law and implement such interpretations should remain in the public domain,
available to all taxpayers and their advisors. The Act mandates that tax strategies are
deemed "insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from the prior art." In other
words, any future tax strategy will be considered indistinguishable from all other
publicly available information that is relevant to a patent's claim of originality. Under
the Act, however, protection (an exclusion) is made available for software that enables
individuals to file their income tax returns or that assists them with managing their
finances. The exclusion does not apply to that part of the software related to a tax
strategy.
Id.
92. Bowman, supra note 68 (noting that as of March 11, 2011, the USPTO had issued 136 tax
strategy patents and published 161 patent [class 705] applications and that of the 136 patents issued
only 32 indicate that a tax strategy is their most comprehensive claim. Of the 32, half deal chiefly
with software. Also 16 of the 136 are considered by the USPTO to be mainly insurance patents).
Prior to Section 14's implementation, the USPTO had issued 136 tax strategy patents and
published 161 tax related patent applications. Less than a quarter of the 136 (32) issued with a
primary 705/36T classification. The number 705 is the business methods class, and 36T is the
particular subset designated for tax strategy matters. Of the 32, half dealt mainly with software, and
16 of the 136 were considered as insurance related patents that also contained a tax strategy
element.
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While the ban on patenting tax strategies is easily measurable in
simplistic, immediate terms, i.e. no applications will any longer
expressly identify tax-planning strategy as the primary claimed
invention, deeper questions remain. One wonders whether a net
negative effect will arise from the chill93 on innovation in an area that was
just beginning to brim with creativity.
Though the immediate devaluation of existing tax strategy patents
is harmful, various avenues remain for the continued origination and
proliferation of tax strategy subject matter as long as it is claimed in a
different manner. Only time will tell whether the current legislation will
be enough to appease those who identified tax strategy patents as strange
low hanging fruit that required immediate obliteration. Surely, those
testifying for the elimination of tax strategy patents were more
concerned with certain kinds of tax strategies than getting rid of the
category as a whole. Automation and technology are an integral part of
the finance industry thus inventions with tax implications which have
previously been acceptable will continue to arise in the future, despite
the uncertainty that recent case law casts over their protectability.
Inventive minds may just reroute their activities to include
computers to carry out the strategies that were previously offered
without the necessity of a software accomplice for purposes of patenting.
Of course, this approach does not guarantee success as Bilski and its
progeny aptly illustrate. 94 Some may also decide to rely' on the longer,
but limited, protection of copyright to a greater extent.
Trade secret
protection is also available for these strategies and it costs nothing at
96
all.

93. Bowman, supranote 68.
94. Samuels, supra note 61 and accompanying text.
95. Copyright law has long been preferred as the protection for software because the costs
involved in procuring it is a minor fraction of the costs associated with patents. Software also has a
relatively short lifespan, thus, writers of protectable software risk losing out on potential
commercial exploitation by seeking patent protection which typically takes a couple of years to
secure as opposed to copyright which may be secured in as little as a couple of months. Once
granted, copyrights last for the life of the author plus seventy years as opposed to the comparatively
pedestrian term of twenty years available for Patent protection. See Pamela Samuelson, Frontiers of
Intellectual Property: Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processesfrom the Scope of Its
Protection, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1921, 1924 (2007) (tracing the history of copyright protection as it
relates to systems and eventually software).
96. See J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 917, 978 (Spring 2011)
(comparing patent protection with the mutually exclusive availability of trade secret protection and
noting the many underappreciated benefits of the latter). See also Joshua I. Miller, Unknown
Futures and the Known Past: What Can Patent Learn From copyright in the New technological
age?, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 9 (2011) (noting the ability of Copyright law to more flexibly
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Perhaps, the area will be revisited and positive experiential data
used to support a limited allowance of openly identified tax strategy
patents without the need to intertwine computer assistance as was done
to some extent with medical procedures in the past.9 7 Of course,
ingenuity may prove that no further actions need be implemented as tax
strategist take advantage of the poorly drafted, loose language of Section
14 to accomplish the very protections that the statute purports to limit.

respond to changes in technology in a manner more certain patent law as reflected by the In re
Bilski decision).
97. The American Medical Association lobbied in support of the Medical Procedures
Innovation and Affordability Act which prevented patents from issuing on surgical and medical
procedures, therapies, diagnosis unless done so through the accompaniment of a patentable
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. See Silvy A. Miller, Should Patentingof Surgical
Procedures and Other Medical Techniques By Physicians Be Banned?, 36 IDEA 255 (1996).
Patent law ultimately amended to provide for exceptions for infringement liability in medical
situations as opposed to banning all medical patents as unpatentable subject matter or declaring
them obvious. See also Fei Hu & Aaron Mallin, Medical Method Patents: Treating "the
Physicians' Immunity Statute", 23 SYRACUSE SC. & TECH. L. REP. 63, 64 (2010) (noting that
patents on medical processes date back to 1952 but that as a result of patent enforcement activities
the Medical Procedures Act was established, which led to the elimination of certain medical
methods patents and limited the liability of medical practitioners for the infringement of valid
medical patents).
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